














increase	of	 its	prison	population.	This	 is	often	explained	as	 the	consequence	of	a	punitive	
populism	sweeping	Latin	America.	Our	article	investigates	what	triggered	this	punitive	turn	
in	Bolivia	by	 identifying	 some	of	 the	 factors	 that	 impact	 crime	policy	 and	 growing	prison	
populations	since	the	election	of	president	Evo	Morales	 in	2006.	We	argue	that	a	complex	
array	of	 local	and	 international	 factors	and	shifts	 in	crime	policy	 to	harden	approaches	 to	
domestic	 violence	 led	 to	 steep	 increases	 in	 remand	 populations.	 Combined	 with	 other	
inefficiencies	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 this	 led	 to	 sustained	 increases	 in	 the	 prison	
population	 throughout	 most	 of	 this	 period.	 This	 study	 is	 based	 on	 new	 and	 previously	


























After	 a	 decade	 of	 increasing	 economic	 inequality	 and	 crime	 rates	 in	 the	 1990s,	 most	 Latin	
American	countries	have	hardened	crime	policy	during	the	2000s.	As	a	result,	 these	countries	
have	experienced	unprecedented	increases	of	their	prison	populations	(Riego	and	Duce	2009:	10;	
Stippel	 2013:	 61‐63).1	 Subsequently,	 criminologists	 have	 tried	 to	 explain	 this	 development,	
referring	 to	 it	 as	 the	 ‘punitive	 turn’	 or	 ‘new	 punitiveness’	 (Goldson	 2002;	 Pratt	 2007),	 and	










countries.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 argument	 does	 not	 explain,	 in	 our	 opinion,	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	
punitive	 turn	 in	 Latin	 America,	 in	 countries	 where	 leftist	 ‘populist’2	 governments	 came	 into	
power,	as	in	Bolivia,	Ecuador	and	Argentina	in	the	last	two	decades.	Accordingly,	we	argue	that,	















national	 but	 also	 international	 interests	 shape	 Bolivian	 crime	 policy?	 Does	 the	 incarceration	
trend	mirror	 the	 ‘populist’	 ideology	 and	 rhetoric	 of	Morales’	 government?	Could	 the	 growing	






































been	 in	place.	 Still,	 he	 finds	 it	 is	hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 the	 levels	of	punitiveness	gained	 in	 the	
populist	period	might	be	overcome.	
	
























penal	 policies	 and	 practices.	 His	 focus	was	 not	 Latin	 America	 but	Western	 countries	 but	 his	
findings	are	helpful	for	our	analysis.		
	
Tonry	understood	penal	 cultures	 and	policies	 to	be	 local;	 thus,	 the	 reasons	 for	harsher	penal	
policies	can	be	found	in	distinctive	cultural,	historical,	constitutional	and	political	conditions.	He	










of	 the	 change	 in	 crime	 policies.	 Amongst	 those,	 he	 counts	 social	 and	 economic	 changes;	
politicization	of	crime	policy;	increased	population	diversity	and	intergroup	conflict;	the	effects	
of	 the	women’s,	 gay,	 and	 civil	 rights	movements;	 and	 increasingly	 global	 and	 sensationalistic	
media.	As	those	developments	affect	all	developed	countries,	they	are	just	background	conditions	




populist	means	would	 be,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 ‘nonfactor’	 if,	 at	 a	 regional	 level,	 they	 could	 be	
considered	 to	 be	 background	 conditions	 affecting	 all	 countries.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Tonry’s	
arguments	would	match	partially	 the	 findings	of	Paladines	(2016).	Both	considered	economic	
factors	 essentially	 unhelpful	 in	 explaining	 penal	 policies	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 incarceration	 rates.	












by	 Sozzo	 (2014)	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Argentina,	 Bolivian	 crime	 policy	 has	 often	 been	 criticized	 for	




a	 ‘hybrid’	 law,	 combining	 in	 a	 single	 act	 provisions	 that	 regulate	 production,	 substitution	
measures	and	eradication	of	coca	leaves,	along	with	criminal	and	procedural	law	and	rules	on	
prevention	(Stippel	and	Serrano	Moreno	2018).	Law	1008	has	been	criticized	by	different	sectors	











on	 8	 March	 2017)	 expands	 the	 areas	 of	 legal	 coca	 leaf	 production	 (from	 12,000	 to	 22,000	
hectares)	and	determines	that	the	Ministry	of	Rural	Development	is	in	charge	of	supervising	the	
commercialization	and	transport	of	coca	leafs.6	It	also	establishes	that	the	coca	plant	is	part	of	the	
















Concerning	 the	 legislative	 activity	 in	 the	previous	period,	 from	 the	 end	of	 the	 dictatorship	 in	
Bolivia	in	1982	to	the	promulgation	of	the	new	constitution	in	2009,	a	total	of	13	acts	were	issued	






approved	by	 the	new	Plurinational	 Legislative	Assembly	 in	 2010	created	 eight	 new	 statutory	
offences,	 all	 linked	 to	 the	 ‘fight’	 against	 corruption.13	 The	 law	was	 not	 limited	 to	 identifying	
offences;	 it	also	created	both	anti‐corruption	courts	and	special	anti‐corruption	prosecutors.14	
Accordingly,	 the	National	 Council	 to	 Combat	 Corruption,	 Illicit	 Enrichment	 and	 Legitimacy	 of	
Illicit	Profits	was	established.15	
	
It	 does	 not	 seem	 coincidental	 that	 this	 first	 law	with	 relevance	 to	 crime	 policy—Law	 004—
formed	 institutions	 similar	 to	 those	 foreseen	 in	 Law	1008,	 including	 specialized	 courts16	 and	





of	 civil	 rights.	 Although	 Law	 004	 represents	 progress	 because	 it	 no	 longer	 violates	 the	














Assembly	 enacted,	 for	 example,	 laws	 that	 claim	 to	 protect,	 through	 criminal	 law,	 highly	
vulnerable	indigenous	people	(Law	450)	and	the	national	cultural	heritage	(Law	530).	Other	acts	
respond	 to	 political	 contingencies	 such	 as	 the	 laws	 that	 foresee	 sanctions	 for	 irresponsible	
tendency	 of	 dangerous	dogs	 (Law	553),	 or	misappropriation	of	 funds	 in	 sport	 activities	 (Law	
804).	Some	rules	can	be	linked	with	the	pressure	exerted	by	certain	interest	groups	that	pushed	
for	penal	 laws	or	their	modification	as	part	of	their	political	agenda.	Here	we	find	the	act	that	





It	 appears	 that,	 nowadays,	 it	 is	 not	 only	 international	 pressure	 and	 foreign	 interests	 that	 are	








there	 was	 a	 steady	 decrease	 in	 the	 number	 of	 offences	 registered	 in	 the	 period	 from	 2000	
(47,300)	to	2005	(32,150).	From	2005	to	2015	the	total	number	of	registered	offences	steadily	








Year	 Total	of	offences	registered	 Estimated	Population	 Rate	per	100,000	population	
2000	 47,300	 8,427,790 561	
2001	 43,782	 8,588,068 510	
2002	 36,565	 8,748,345 418	
2003	 36,162	 8,908,625 406	
2004	 36,015	 9,068,890 397	
2005	 32,150	 9,229,155 348	
2006	 35,463	 9,389,422 378	
2007	 39,817	 9,549,689 417	
2008	 45,768	 9,709,958 471	
2009	 49,815	 9,870,229 504	
2010	 58,436	 10,030,501 583	
2011	 57,756	 10,190,775 567	
2012	 62,602	 10,351,118 605	
2013	 72,331	 10,507,789 688	
2014	 68,918	 10,665,841 646	
2015	 88,895	 10,825,013 821	
2016	 85,613	 10,985,059 779	
Sources:	
2000	 to	 2014	 offences	 data:	 Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics,	 Table	 No.	 3090203	 (available	 at	
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion‐6/introduccion‐3;	accessed	25	April	2017).	
2015	and	2016	offences	data:	Bolivian	Police	(2016:	10).		






in	 El	 Alto	 in	 October	 2003.20	 The	 future	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 whole	 was	 uncertain.	 People	 lost	
confidence	in	the	state	institutions	including	the	police	force,	and	they	therefore	sought	to	solve	





















before	 Law	 004	 was	 enacted	 in	 2009	 (see	 Table	 2).	 Nevertheless	 from	 2009	 to	 2014,	 the	
registered	offences	increased	almost	 fourfold	(from	832	to	3,163).	To	a	 lesser	degree	but	also	




























2000	 270	 107 193 3,344 3,078	
2001	 279	 126 124 2,587 2,957	
2002	 199	 114 126 2,128 2,610	
2003	 337	 215 76 2,088 2,565	
2004	 283	 223 70 2,509 3,748	
2005	 465	 251 30 1,415 876	
2006	 392	 243 139 2,153 2,724	
2007	 483	 206 84 2,480 1,013	
2008	 542	 313 259 2,584 1,216	
2009	 832	 369 299 3,068 1,130	
2010	 1,363	 330 2 3,965 2,299	
2011	 1,904	 357 286 3,606 2,586	
2012	 2,432	 493 588 4,857 2,671	
2013	 2,440	 679 666 4,845 2,494	
2014	 3,163	 778 616 4,154 2,363	
2015	 1,617	 128 0 2,305 1,712	








Source:	 Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (INE),	 Table	 No.	 3090203	 (available	 at		







The	data	 indicate	that	 the	proliferation	of	special	 laws	contributed	to	 the	 increase	of	offences	



























2000	 8,124	 96 5,415 66,4	
2001	 5,565	 65 3,747 67,2	
2002	 6,077	 69 3,932 64,8	
2003	 5,669	 64 4,434 78,2	
2004	 6,495	 72 4,790 73,7	
2005	 6,793	 74 5,029 74.0	
2006	 7,031	 75 5,232 74,4	
2007	 7,683	 80 5,672 73,8	
2008	 7,435	 77 5,240 70,5	
2009	 8,096	 82 6,074 75,2	
2010	 9,406	 94 7,259 77,2	
2011	 11,195	 110 9,357 83,6	
2012	 14,272	 138 12,163 85,2	
2013	 14,415	 137 11,996 83,2	
2014	 14,220	 133 11,642 81,9	
2015	 13,593	 126 n.a. n.a.	















June	 2000‐June	 2014	 data:	 Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics,	 Table	 No.	 3090403	 (available	 at	
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion‐6/introduccion‐5	(accessed	26	October	2018	




The	 prison	 population	 grew	 around	 75	 per	 cent	 from	 2000	 (8,124)	 to	 2014	 (14,220).	 In	
comparison,	registered	offences	increased	by	46	per	cent	over	the	same	timeframe	(from	47,300	




Nevertheless,	 if	 we	 look	 at	 the	 evolution	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 pre‐trial	 detainees,	 this	 possible	
conclusion	appears	to	be	less	likely.	Thus	far,	the	absolute	peak	of	the	pre‐trial	detention	rates	














or	 20	 per	 cent)	 or	 for	 drug	 related	 offences	 (2,977	 or	 20	 per	 cent).	 Persons	 accused	 of	 or	





almost	 4,000	 such	 offences	 registered	 in	 2014),	 none	 appeared	 as	 detainees	 in	 the	 prison	
statistics.	Hence,	it	seems	that	Law	004,	the	first	law	of	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia	that	was	
aimed	 at	 containing	 new	 offences	 and	 increasing	 sanctions	 for	 several	 existing	 ones,	 did	 not	
contribute	to	the	increase	in	the	incarceration	rate.		
	
We	 cannot	 correlate	 these	 data	 with	 other	 statistics.	 But,	 the	 apparent	 lower	 rates	 of	




powerful	 such	 as	 corruption	 are	 systemically	 under‐criminalised	 (Barak	 2015).	 Thus,	 the	
statistics	 indicate	that	prosecuting	corruption	in	Bolivia	needs	more	a	sophisticated	system	of	





































The	 high	 minimum	 penalty	 for	 rape	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 judges	 are	 requested	 to	 impose	 the	





institutions	 in	charge	of	controlling	crime	steadily	grew.	In	the	 last	decade,	 the	Police	and	the	
General	Prosecutor’s	Office	have	benefitted	from	a	constant	increase	in	their	staff	and	budget.32	
	
























Upon	 full	 implementation	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Procedure	 Code	 on	 30	 May	 2001,	 the	 number	 of	





























2013	 208,517	 143,295 69		
2014	 202,360	 115,038 57	




In	2015,	prosecutors	 in	 the	capital	cities	and	El	Alto	 formalized	charges	 in	13,096	cases.36	An	
additional	5,961	cases	were	presented	outside	the	capital	cities,37	making	a	total	of	19,057	formal	
charges	 filed	 on	 a	 national	 level.	 That	 means	 that,	 on	 average,	 each	 of	 the	 498	 prosecutors	
presented	about	38	formal	charges	in	the	year,	amounting	to	less	than	one	per	week.		
	
The	most	 common	way	 prosecutors	 end	 a	 case	 is	 to	 file	 refusal	 reports.	 Generally	when	 this	
happens,	 the	 Police	 Force—under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 General	 Prosecutor’s	 Office—has	 been	
unable	to	identify	the	possible	perpetrator.38	In	practice,	the	case	is	archived	and	ends	without	
anyone	being	held	accountable	for	the	alleged	commission	of	the	reported	crime.	We	have	to	bear	
in	mind	 that	 the	maximum	 duration	 of	 preliminary	 police	 investigations	 shall	 not	 exceed	 20	
days.39	By	the	end	of	this	period,	the	police	should	send	their	report	to	the	prosecutors,	who	then	
should	analyze	the	content	immediately.	In	exceptional	cases,	the	law	allows	the	extension	of	this	
























2013	 121,255	 47,059 9,232 6,207	
2014	 83,852	 64,215 12,901 7,790	



















Office	 had	 not	 become	 a	 leading	 institution	 in	 the	 reform,	 and	 that	 their	 annual	 operative	























The	 Bolivian	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 lacks	 coherence.	 It	 is	 plagued	 with	 systemic	 flaws	 in	
processing	and	prosecuting	crimes.	While	harsher	sentences	were	introduced	for	some	crimes	
(that	is,	corruption)	and	new	crimes	added	to	those	punishable,	the	dysfunction	in	the	system	did	











on	 support	 from	 international	 cooperation.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 high	 percentage	 of	 alleged	
offenders	for	pre‐trial	detention	casts	some	doubt	on	whether	this	policy	change	will	lead	to	more	
convictions	or	 just	 to	more	people	awaiting	 trial.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	new	anti‐corruption	
legislation	(Law	004)	appears	to	make	a	symbolic	statement,	as	 it	 is	without	a	 real	 impact	on	
practice,	as	the	statistics	in	Tables	2	and	4	show.	
	
Both	 examples	 support	 Tonry’s	 thesis	 that,	 even	 when	 penal	 policies	 become	 harsher,	 what	












policy	 in	 general,	 because	 the	 policies	 contained	 in	 laws	 have	 always	 been	 national	 but	 not	
necessarily	 self‐determining.	 Indeed,	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	 century,	 about	60	per	 cent	of	 all	
prisoners	were	doing	time	for	drug‐related	offences.	Today	this	percentage	has	dropped	to	about	
20	 per	 cent.	 Nowadays,	 other	 crimes,	 such	 as	 robbery	 and	 rape,	 make	 up	 for	 the	 similar	




Tonry	 (2007:	 32)	 argues	 that	 ‘few	 officials	 in	 any	Western	 country	 would	 argue	 that	 public	
attitudes	and	beliefs	are	inappropriate	considerations	in	setting	general	policies,	within	certain	
limits’.	We	argue	 that	 the	same	applies	 in	the	case	of	Bolivia.	We	believe	that	 the	country	has	
chosen	to	use	public	opinion	rather	than	international	pressure	as	its	main	source	for	legitimizing	
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political	 communicational	 strategies—anti‐establishment	 discourse,	 mobilization	 of	 emotions,	















Penal	 and	Procedural	 Law	 (Código	del	Sistema	Penal),	 under	discussion	 in	 the	Bolivian	parliament,	 if	
passed,	eliminates	also	the	penal	provisions	of	Law	1008.		
9	In	2000,	the	total	prison	population	of	Bolivia	was	at	8,124;	4,753	prisoners	(58.5	per	cent)	were	detained	
for	 drug	 offences	 (Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (INE),	 Table	 No.	 3090404.	 Available	 at	
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion‐6/introduccion‐5	(accessed	25	April	2017).	
10	In	2016,	Bolivia	counted	a	prison	population	of	15,056	persons;	2.977	(19.8	per	cent)	were	detained	for	




















































43	 Tonry	 (2007:	 1,	 12)	 finds,	 in	 relation	 to	 western	 countries,	 that	 ‘if	 penal	 populism	 or	 populist	
punitiveness	exists	at	all,	it	is	mostly	as	reifications	in	academics'	minds	of	other	academics'	ideas’.		
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